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Abstract 
 
Studies on the productivity spillovers of FDI have concentrated on the national-
sectoral level. As a result, little is known about the impact of FDI on absolute 
and relative regional economic performance. In this paper we examine this issue 
by relying on a unique dataset of over 20,000 Greek firms for the period 2002-
2006  covering  all  sectors  of  economic  activity.  We  examine  the  spatial 
distribution of foreign-owned firms in the country and analyse the effect that 
their  presence  –  at  the  local,  regional  and  national  levels  –  has  on  the 
productivity of domestic firms. We find strong evidence suggesting that foreign-
owned firms self-select into regions and sectors of high productivity. Net of this 
selection  effect,  the  impact  of  foreign  presence  on  domestic  productivity  is 
negative – although at the very local level some positive spillover effects are 
identifiable. The bulk of the effects concentrate in non-manufacturing activities, 
high-tech sectors, and medium-sized high-productivity firms. Importantly, this 
effect is not constant across space however. Productivity spillovers tend to be 
negative in the regions hosting the main urban areas in the country but positive 
in smaller and more peripheral regions. In this way, despite the tendency of FDI 
to concentrate in a limited number of areas within the country – those of the 
highest level of development – the externalities that FDI activity generates to the 
local economies appear to be of a rather equilibrating character.  
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1. Introduction 
Foreign  direct  investment  can  be  an  important  source  of  economic 
development  for  recipient  economies.  FDI  inflows  strengthen  capital 
accumulation and job creation domestically, while they improve the fiscal and 
external  position  of  the  recipient  countries,  thus  helping  finance  government 
expenditures  that  can  further  stimulate  economic  development  (Caves,  2007; 
Dunning  and  Lundan,  2008).  Besides  these  macroeconomic  effects,  foreign 
investments may have more direct effects on industrial activity and performance, 
through  their  impact  on  the  technology  and  productivity  of  domestic  firms. 
Owing  to  their  technological  and  other  advantages,  foreign-owned  firms  can 
generate significant externalities for the domestic economy. These can operate 
mainly  through  three  channels:  pecuniary/demand  spillovers,  technological/ 
learning spillovers, and competition effects
1. 
There is now a large literature examining the magnitude and direction of 
these  effects.  Reflecting  its  industrial  and  business  economics  origins,  the 
literature has typically focused at the national-sectoral level, as these spillovers 
are assumed to operate along sectoral lines. As a consequence, only limited 
attention has been paid to the spatial distribution of FDI spillovers and the 
identification of region-specific effects accruing from FDI. Of the few cases that 
have  studied  regional -level  FDI  spillovers,  most  have  either  treated  the 
geographical information as an additional dimension in their sample (Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999; Blalock and Gertler, 2008) or have limited their focus to the role 
that  industrial  clusters  and  agglomeration  play  for  the  realisation  of  FDI 
spillovers (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2005; De Propris and Driffield, 
2006)  –  both  without  explicitly  examining  the  geography  of such spillovers. 
Only very few studies have instead examined the process of diffusion of FDI 
spillovers  across  space  (Halpern  and  Murak￶zy,  2007;  Haskel  et  al,  2007; 
Jordaan, 2008) and, to our knowledge, only one has examined specifically the 
issue of differentiation in the direction and magnitude of FDI spillovers across 
space (Mullen and Williams, 2007). By implication therefore, there is a notable 
gap  in  our  knowledge  and  understanding  of  the  overall  impact  of  foreign 
investment on the host country‟s regional economic structure and performance. 
This paper makes an important contribution in this regard, by providing an 
analysis of the location and productivity spillovers of FDI at the regional and 
sub-regional (local) level and examining both the process of spatial diffusion of 
                                                           
1 See Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and Aitken and Harrison (1999) for an early literature on these 
issues and Smeets (2008) for an excellent review of these theoretical channels. It should be noted 
that spillovers can also be negative (and empirically they appear to be so more often than not), 
especially in cases where market-capturing by the foreign affiliates creates a „demand-siphoning‟ 
effect  for  the  domestic  firms  which  raises  average  production  costs  and  lowers  productivity. 
Moran et al (2005) offer an extensive discussion of positive and negative productivity effects that 
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FDI spillovers and the extent of differentiation of these spillovers across space. 
We  focus  on  the  case  of  Greece,  a  country  with  a  significantly  skewed 
geographical production structure (over-concentration of economic activity in a 
few centres) and a low degree of FDI attraction. Owing to these features, Greece 
appears  as  a  particularly  appealing  empirical  case  –  where  the  geographical 
concentration of FDI is expected to be more intense and spatial differences in the 
extent of spillovers more heightened. Our analysis sets to explore three main 
questions. First, what has been the incidence and sectoral distribution of foreign 
activity across the regional economies of Greece. Second, what is the effect of 
foreign activity on the productivity of domestic firms in the country and how 
localised is this effect. Third, whether and to what extent are FDI spillovers 
regionally differentiated and conditioned upon specific firm-level, sectoral and 
regional characteristics. 
Our data refer to a firm-level panel of annual observations covering the 
period 2002-2006, a period of relative stability and fast growth, starting after the 
country‟s successful adoption of the EURO and ending before the first signs of 
the  global  financial  crisis.  All  data  are  derived  from  the  Amadeus  database 
produced by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), which contains firm-level information on 
turnover, fixed assets, employment, ownership and other variables of interest for 
the majority of European countries, covering all sectors of economic activity. 
For  Greece,  the  Amadeus  database  contains  some  27,000  firms  per  year,  of 
which just over 2,000 are foreign owned, representing an employment share of 
7.78%.
2 This dataset is unique in its detail and coverage and, to our knowledge, 
it has not been used before for the case of Greece. 
Our  starting  premise  is  that  FDI  spillovers  are  essentially  and 
fundamentally heterogeneous across space – not least because FDI itself tends to 
be  particularly  concentrated,  especially  in  locations  of  high  productivity, 
accessibility and industrial agglomeration. The scant existing empirical evidence 
seems to support this claim, showing that industrial clustering (agglomeration) is 
significant not only for attracting foreign firms (Guimaraes et al, 2000; Hilber 
and Voicu, 2010) but also for determining the size of the realised productivity 
spillovers (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2005; De Propris and Driffield, 
2006).  There  are  also  good  theoretical  reasons  to  expect  FDI-induced 
productivity  spillovers  to  take  a  heterogeneous  geographical  manifestation  – 
although the effects can go either way. On the one hand, foreign investments 
may  be  less  able  to  generate  positive  spillovers  in  less  developed  regions 
                                                           
2 As is standard in the literature, we define a firm as foreign owned if at least 10% of its value is 
owned by an ultimate owner who is resident or established outside the country. After excluding 
thus defined foreign affiliates and observations with incomplete or erroneous information, our 
estimating sample reduces to just over 20,000 firms (98,408 firms-specific observations in the 
pooled sample) – bringing the average employment share of foreign-owned firms to just below 
13%.   142   Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN 
 
because their technological distance to local firms does not allow for potential 
spillovers  to  be  absorbed  (the  „absorptive  capacity‟  argument  –  see  Kokko, 
1994; Damijan et al, 2001; Girma, 2005; Jordaan, 2009). On the other hand, 
foreign investments may produce larger spillovers in less developed regions, as 
firms there are typically less exposed to international competition and have thus 
more  to  „learn‟  from  the  foreign-owned  firms  (the  „scope  for  spillovers‟ 
argument  –  see  Kinoshita,  2000;  Merlevede  and  Schoors,  2005;  Gersl  et  al, 
2007; Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011).
3  
In the remainder of this paper we set to explore the empirical validity of 
these expectations by providing a holistic analysis of the incidence, geographical 
scale and spatial differentiation of FDI-induced productivity spillovers across the 
Greek regions.  We examine the incidence and sectoral distribution of foreign 
activity in section 2. Section 3 presents our econometric analysis, which explores 
in detail the FDI productivity spillovers and the extent to which they diffuse 
across space (how localised they are and how nei ghbouring FDI affects local 
productivity).  In  section  4  we  analyse  the  issue  of  spatial  and  functional 
differentiation of these spillovers. We conclude with a short discussion of the 
implications of our findings for both policy and the empirical literature  on FDI 
spillovers.  
 
2. FDI in Greece and its regions 
Historically,  Greece  has  not  been  an  important  recipient  of  FDI.  The 
country embarked on a policy to encourage inward investments since the 1950s 
and while FDI flows recorded an almost continuous growth (in absolute terms) 
for decades (Louri et al, 2000), its total inward FDI stock was below 10% of 
GDP in the 1990s and 2000s with annual FDI flows representing less than 10% 
of total gross fixed capital formation in the country (UNCTAD, 2009). As a 
result, Greece ranks persistently at the bottom of the international rankings of 
FDI recipients and its FDI stock represents less than 1% of the total inward FDI 
stock of the EU27. Moreover, it appears that the technology content of inward 
FDI in Greece is also particularly low: according to data by the Bank of Greece, 
in 2008 manufacturing accounted for some 33% of the total stock of inward FDI, 
                                                           
3 Ambiguity also exists with regard to the location of FDI across regions. Theory and empirical 
evidence suggest that FDI tends to locate in national capitals and some highly accessible and 
relatively  developed  regions,  which  “cream-off”  the  most  productive  foreign  investors,  thus 
reinforcing existing spatial asymmetries in production structures and capabilities (Guimaraes et al, 
2000; Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001; Resmini, 2008 – see Pantelidis and Nikolopoulos, 2008 for 
the case of Greece). In theory, however, high-productivity foreign-owned firms may also choose to 
locate in less developed regions, as part of a strategy to protect their technological advantages 
from diffusing to their domestic competitors who are typically located in the more developed 
regions of the host country.  
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almost two-thirds of which was in sectors producing consumer goods, with FDI 
in the manufacture of capital goods representing a mere 0.8% of the total FDI 
stock in the country.  
This is consistent with findings of previous research, which has shown 
that FDI is below the country‟s potential (Papazoglou, 2001; UNCTAD, 2004; 
Kokkinou  and  Psycharis,  2004),  predominantly  of  a  market-seeking  type 
(Georganta et al, 1986; Georgopoulos and Preusse, 2006) and concentrating in 
traditional sectors that are characterised by low technology and labour-intensive 
production  (Barrios  et  al,  2004).  The  low  degree  and  quality  of  FDI  in  the 
country has often been attributed to factors such as the extent of red-tape and 
bureaucracy,  high  tax  rates,  poor  infrastructure  and  a  weak  business  and 
macroeconomic  environment  (Apergis  and  Katrakylidis,  1998;  Barbosa  and 
Louri, 2002; Filippaios and Kottaridi, 2004; Pantelidis and Nikolopoulos, 2008).  
Previous  research  has  also  shown  that  FDI  in  Greece  is  highly 
concentrated, along both sectoral and spatial lines (Dimelis et al, 2004; Bitzenis 
et al, 2007). Indeed, together with manufacturing, three other sectors account 
jointly for over 90% of the FDI stock in the country (financial services 30%, 
transport and communications 15%, wholesale/retail trade 13%).
4 Interestingly, 
the Hotel and Restaurants sector, which includes the tourism industry, one of the 
country‟s  main  comparative  advantages,  only  accounts  for  2%  of  total  FDI 
stock. FDI appears also particularly concentrated across space. Bank of Greece 
data show that in the period 2000-2008 only 25 out of the 51 NUTS3 regions of 
the country received any form of FDI, with 87% of FDI inflows going to the 
prefecture of Attiki, where the national capital is situated, and the fifth highest 
FDI recipient accounting for a mere 0.5% of total FDI inflows into the country 
(€100m compared to a national figure of €18.8bn).  
Thus,  both  along  sectoral  and  geographical  lines,  the  distribution  of 
foreign-owned activity in Greece is particularly skewed, with FDI being of an 
important relative size in only a few sectors and regions. This is also revealed in 
the data derived from the Amadeus database. Using this data, Figure 1 presents 
the geography of FDI concentration (employment in foreign-owned firms as a 
share of total employment in each region) at the NUTS3 level, averaged over the 
2002-2006 period. 
 
 
                                                           
4 Data refer to the on the book value of investments derived from the Bank of Greece. In our data 
we  get  a  similar  picture  of  concentration  in  these  main  sectors,  although  given  that  we  use 
employment  than  investment  shares  the  ranking  of  the  sectors  is  different,  reflecting  sectoral 
differences in capital-labour ratios. The four main sectors account in our data for 85% of total 
employment  in  foreign-owned  firms  (wholesale  and  retail  trade:  37%;  manufacturing:  26%; 
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Figure  1.  Presence  of  foreign-owned  activity  in  the  Greek  regions 
(employment shares, period average, 2002-2006) 
 
Source: Authors‟ calculations from the Amadeus database (BvD).  
Note: Regions have been classified into five groups using a „natural breaks‟ criterion   
 
Figure  2  presents  the  same  information  this  time  split  by  sector 
(manufacturing – non-manufacturing). As can be seen, high-concentrations of 
foreign-owned  activity  are  mainly  in  the  regions  of  Attiki  and  Thessaloniki, 
which host the two main urban centres in the country, and secondarily in the 
island  regions  of  Lesvos  (for  manufacturing)  and  the  Dodecanese  (for  non-
manufacturing). Foreign-owned activity in the rest of the country is very sparse. DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT?    145 
 
Overall, out of the 51 NUTS3 regions, in only two regions in the country does 
employment in foreign-owned firms represent more than 6% of total regional 
employment –while in only another 10 regions does it represent a share above 
2%. 
 
Figure 2. Foreign-owned activity by broad sector and region (employment 
shares, period average, 2002-2006) 
Manufacturing         Non-manufacturing 
 
Note: See note in Figure 1.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest a rather high degree of geographical concentration 
of FDI around two main clusters (centred in the main cities of Athens – Attiki, 
Voiotia, Evoia – and Thessaloniki – Thessaloniki, Kilkis, Pieria), with a few 
„hotspots‟ of FDI activity in the remaining periphery. To examine to what extent 
this  visual  pattern  is  supported  by  statistical  evidence  of  spatial  association 
across or within regions, we performed an exploratory spatial data analysis (see 
Anselin, 1995) using various definitions of neighbourliness based on distance 
thresholds  or  on  a  pre-defined  maximum  number  of  neighbours.
5  Figure 3 
reports the results obtained from the analysis based on the 4 -nearest neighbours 
criterion. The maps depict the membership of regions into different types of 
spatial association. The high -high cluster (black shade) includes regions that 
have high shares of FDI employment and are also surrounded by regions of high 
FDI shares. The high-low cluster (dark grey) includes high -FDI regions which 
                                                           
5 We used a range of alternative distance cut-off points as well as the k-nearest neighbour criterion 
for values of k in the range {2, 8}. Using contiguity-based neighbourliness is not appropriate in the 
case of Greece due to its peculiar physical geography (many island regions). In no case was the 
level of global spatial association greater than 0.03 and in no case was it statistically significant 
(the expected value of the Moran‟s I is around 0.16).  146   Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN 
 
are surrounded by regions with low FDI shares. Similarly, the low-low and low-
high  clusters  include  regions  that  have  low  FDI  employment  shares  and  are 
surrounded by regions that also have low FDI shares (plain grey shade) or by 
regions with high FDI shares (light grey stripes). Regions for which no statistical 
association exists between local and neighbouring values are coloured white.   
As can be seen, there is very little evidence of clustering across space. The 
Moran‟s I, which measures the extent to which local outcomes correlate with 
outcomes  in  neighbouring  regions,  is  effectively  zero;  while  although  a  few 
„hotspots‟ can be identified, these are not necessarily in the places one would 
expect them to appear. Specifically, for total FDI there are two main hotspots, 
both located in the west (Ioannina and Etoloakarnania). These two regions are 
effectively  „spatial  outliers‟,  having  relatively  high  shares  of  FDI  but  being 
surrounded  by  regions  with  low  FDI  shares.  Three  other  regions  constitute 
negative outliers, in the sense that they have neighbouring regions with high 
values but they themselves have low shares of employment in foreign-owned 
firms. Finally, two main clusters are also observable: Kozani in the north is the 
centre of a low-low cluster, while Evoia in Central Greece signifies the high-
high cluster which extends southwards to Attiki and northwards to Magnisia (see 
Figure 1 for the location of specific regions). Interestingly, this picture is not 
replicated in either of the maps that depict the geography of spatial association 
of FDI employment in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. The 
Etoloakarnania  outlier  survives  in  the  case  of  manufacturing  and  some  new 
outliers emerge in the case of non-manufacturing, but overall there is very little 
consistency between the different maps, suggesting that even in cases where 
local spatial association is statistically significant, the extent of clustering across 
regions is rather weak.  
 
Figure 3. Local clusters of FDI (LISA maps) 
 
 
     
FDI: 
Moran‟s I: 
Total 
0.0016 
Manufacturing 
0.0283 
Non-manufacturing 
-0.0200 
Note: See text and footnote 7.  
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The high degree of geographical concentration of FDI within Greece and 
its low technological content makes it plausible that, despite being a relatively 
small proportion of the domestic economy, it can generate significant spillovers. 
This  is  because  spillovers  often  occur  inside  agglomerations  and  in  a  rather 
localised manner (Driffield and Munday, 2001; Jordaan, 2009)
6 and because the 
low technological content means that problems of absorptive capacity for the 
domestic firms are less likely to arise. Indeed, this  is not refuted in the scant 
literature that exists on the topic in Greece. The study by Dimelis and Louri 
(2002) for a sample of manufacturing firms found some evidence of positive 
productivity spillovers to domestic firms – but only from firms with a minority 
foreign ownership. A similar effect was found by Barrios et al (2004), although 
in  that  study  the  effect  vanished  when  controls  were  introduced  for  sectoral 
heterogeneity.  Finally,  Fotopoulos  and  Louri  (2004)  also  provide  indirect 
evidence of positive spillovers in their analysis of foreign presence and domestic 
firm growth, finding that foreign participation accelerates firm growth especially 
for medium-sized firms. To our knowledge, no other study has examined the 
extent and nature of FDI spillovers in Greece and no study has done so with any 
attention to the geography of these spillovers. Our analysis in the remainder of 
this paper seeks to fill this gap by providing unique evidence on the direction 
and intensity of FDI spillovers across the Greek regions.  
 
3. FDI spillovers across the Greek regions 
As mentioned earlier, our dataset consists of firm-level data on turnover, 
fixed assets and employment, organised across sectors (NACE2 and NACE4), 
regions (NUTS2 and NUTS3) and years (2002-2006). Additionally, we have 
aggregated  the  foreign  ownership  information  at  the  sectoral  (NACE2)  and 
regional (NUTS3) level to construct a variable measuring the intra-sector share 
of foreign ownership in each of the 51 prefectures of Greece. As is standard in 
the literature, we follow a production-function approach, where firm-level output 
is made a function of each firm‟s value of fixed assets and level of employment, 
adding the FDI variable as an additional regressor. Our approach implies that 
investment  and  manning  decisions  are  not  influenced  by  a  firms‟  own 
productivity and that FDI affects a firm‟s total factor productivity but not its 
level  of  investment  or  employment.  Although  the  literature  has  occasionally 
questioned the full validity of such assumptions (see Olley and Pakes, 1996; 
Jarvocik,  2004),  others  have  shown  that  the  bias  introduced  by  these 
assumptions  is  minimal,  especially  in  empirical  studies  with  limited  time-
horizons (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011).  
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Empirically, our estimating model takes the following form: 
yirst = a + b1kirst + b2lirst + eirst               (1) 
which we later amend with the inclusion of the FDI variable and occasionally by 
adding various fixed effects. Thus, our full estimating model is 
yirst = a + b1kirst + b2lirst + cHrst + Rrd1 + Ssd2 + Ttd3 + Fid4 + eirst  (2) 
where  small  letters  stand  for  logarithms,  y  is  turnover;  k  is  capital 
(measured  by  fixed  assets);  l  is  employment;  H  is  the  employment  share  of 
foreign-owned firms; R, S, T, and F are vectors containing binary dummies for 
regions, sectors, time and firms, respectively; a, b1, b2, c, d1, d2, d3 and d4 are 
coefficients to be estimated; i, r, s, and t index firms, regions, sectors and time, 
respectively; and e is an error term. We do not restrict the coefficients b1 and b2 
to add up to one, thus allowing for increasing or decreasing returns to scale. We 
experiment with different definitions of the H variable (at the NUTS2 level, the 
NUTS3 level, or both) and we introduce the various sets of dummy variables 
selectively in alternative specifications.  
Given  the  fact  that  our  sample  contains  many  dimensions  (sectors, 
regions,  years),  we  start  our  analysis  by  examining  the  performance  of  our 
production-function  model  across  alternative  fixed-effects  specifications, 
introducing  gradually  additional  regressors  to  control  for  these  dimensions. 
Table 1 presents the results from this analysis. As can be seen, our base model 
performs very well and the obtained factor elasticities are very robust to the 
inclusion of controls for the different dimensions of our dataset.  
 
Table 1. Production function analysis 
Model: 
ln(output)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ln(capital)  0.133***  0.131***  0.192***  0.200***  0.158***  0.160***  0.206***  0.112*** 
(0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0019)  (0.0020)  (0.0020)  (0.0019)  (0.0026) 
ln(employ-ment)  0.606***  0.608***  0.638***  0.628***  0.574***  0.573***  0.612***  0.397*** 
(0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0036)  (0.0036)  (0.0039)  (0.0039)  (0.0036)  (0.016) 
Constant  5.002***  4.901***  4.525***  4.440***  4.686***  4.715***  4.129***  5.564*** 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.038)  (0.099)  (0.025)  (0.044)  (0.10)  (0.041) 
Fixed effects  No  Time  Nace2  Nace4  NUTS2  NUTS3  All  Firms  
& Time 
Obs  98407  98407  98407  98407  98407  98407  98407  98407 
R-sq  0.35  0.35  0.49  0.53  0.36  0.37  0.54  0.05 
Notes: Model (8) is estimated using the Fixed Effects Within estimator. All other regressions are 
estimated  with  OLS.  NACE2  (NACE4)  contains  54  (429)  sectoral  dummies  while  NUTS2 
(NUTS3)  contains  13  (51)  regional  dummies.  The  model  of  column  7  includes  dummies  for 
NACE4, NUTS3 and time.  
 
The coefficient on capital is rather low, but within acceptable limits, and it 
increases  somewhat  when  we  add  sectoral  controls,  which  appear  to  control 
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more stable suggesting little variation across sectors or regions in the extent of 
labour  hoarding.  Together,  the  two  coefficients  are  consistently  below  1, 
suggesting the presence of decreasing returns to scale in the Greek economy – a 
finding consistent with the widely acknowledged inefficiency of its production 
system (Bryant et al, 2001; Pagoulatos, 2003).  
Importantly, adding temporal fixed effects does not affect the regression 
estimates,  consistent  with  the  observation  that  the  2002-2006  period  was  a 
period of relative stability for Greece. As mentioned above, sectoral controls 
(either  at  the  2-  or  4-digit  of  the  NACE  classification)  raise  the  estimated 
productivity of capital (columns 3 and 4). The influence of the regional fixed 
effects (columns 5 and 6) is smaller and is again very similar for fixed effects of 
different spatial scales (NUTS2 or NUTS3), suggesting that regional differences 
in  production  technologies  are  minimal  and  smaller  than  differences  across 
sectors.  Finally,  introducing  firm-specific  fixed  effects  (which  subsume  the 
regional and sectoral controls) leads to a drop in the estimated coefficients for 
capital  and  labour,  as  these  effects  capture  unobserved  firm-specific 
characteristics  which  contribute  to  firm  output  (managerial  capacities, 
distribution/client networks, etc).  
To  this  basic  but  well  performing  specification  we  add  next  our  FDI 
variable. We experiment with different specifications of this variable for reasons 
that will become clear in the discussion that follows. Table 2 presents a set of 
key findings. We start by introducing a sector-specific FDI measure calculated at 
the NUTS2 level (columns 1-5). When not controlling for fixed effects, of any 
type, the impact of foreign firms on domestic productivity appears positive and 
very significant. An increase in the employment share of foreign-owned firms by 
one  percentage  point  (e.g.,  from  the  sample  average  of  13%  to  14%)  raises 
domestic productivity by 1.7%, with the effect being significant well beyond the 
1% level. 
Controlling for firm heterogeneity (column 2) maintains this significance 
but reduces the magnitude of the estimated spillover by more than 10 times. This 
clearly suggests that foreign investments concentrate in regions and sectors with 
high concentrations of firms that possess productivity-enhancing unobservable 
characteristics, such as good managerial practices and inter-firm networks. This 
is consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature (Head et al, 1995; Hilber 
and Voicu, 2010). The observed productivity spillovers increase somewhat when 
we replace the firm-specific fixed effects with sector-specific ones (column 3), 
but  remain  many  times  lower  than  those  obtained  through  a  simple  OLS 
estimation  (column  1).  Moreover,  when  we  additionally  cluster  the  standard 
errors  within  sectors  (column  4)  the  estimated  spillover  effect  becomes 150   Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN 
 
statistically not different from zero.
7,8 This suggests that a large part of the self-
selection  of  foreign  investments  takes  place  across  sectoral  lines:  high 
productivity sectors typically attract above-average amounts of FDI. 
The  influence  of  self-selection,  however,  appears  even  stronger  in  its 
spatial dimension. When NUTS3 fixed effects are added (col.5), the estimated 
spillover effect becomes significantly negative and rather large (a rise in foreign 
presence  by  1  percentage point  reduces  domestic  productivity  by  0.55%).  In 
other words, when we control for geographical differences in productivity, the 
effect of FDI turns out negative. This result, which is very consistent across 
different specifications as we shall see later, has a very important implication for 
the  study  of  the  spatial  effects  of  FDI:  productivity  spillovers  appear 
misleadingly  positive,  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  foreign  investments 
concentrate –in the case of Greece very heavily– in regions of above-average 
productivity. Net of this self-selection effect, the impact of FDI is to reduce 
domestic  productivity,  reflecting  a  negative  competition  effect,  which 
presumably operates via one of the following channels: by lowering pre-existing 
monopolistic rents, by creaming off skilled labour in the sector/region, or by 
lowering the market share of domestic firms. All these channels are consistent 
with features that are known to characterise the Greek economy, such as low 
labour  mobility,  low  effective  competition  within  sectors  and  attraction  of 
foreign investments which are predominantly of a market-seeking type.   
These results are fully replicated when using an FDI measure defined at a 
much narrower geographical scale, namely the NUTS3 level (see col.6-10). The 
results there are qualitatively identical to those obtained from the NUTS2-level 
analysis,  although  in  general  the  estimated  elasticities  are  somewhat  higher, 
implying that the positive impact of foreign presence on domestic productivity is 
stronger at a more localised level.  
The  negative  spillover  effect  that  we  identify  when  controlling  for 
regional fixed effects –and thus for self-selection of foreign affiliates into high-
productivity  regions–  casts  doubt  on  the  conventional  wisdom  about  the 
beneficial  effects  of  FDI  but  is  not  at  odds  with  empirical  estimates  in  the 
international literature (Haddad and Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; 
Blomstr￶m  and  Sjoholm,  1999;  Damijan  et  al,  2001;  Kugler,  2006; 
Gorodnichenko  et  al,  2007).  A  possible  factor  that  could  account  for  this 
negative effect, if one maintains that the overall impact of FDI should be  
 
                                                           
7 This is necessary to account for the fact that our FDI variable is measured at the sectoral level. 
Clustered standard errors relax the assumption of within-cluster independence, thus allowing for 
firm-specific productivities within sectors to be correlated and, by implication, for the errors to be 
heteroskedastic. 
8 The same result is obtained when we cluster the standard errors within regions, as well as when 
we cluster within region-sector clusters (results available upon request).  DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT?    151 
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positive,  is  the  possibility  that  the  beneficial  effects  of  FDI  take  time  to 
materialise, i.e. occur with some hysterisis (Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011). 
 If this hypothesis is valid, then we should observe a contemporaneous negative 
association  between  foreign  presence  and  domestic  productivity  but  a  more 
positive relation between current domestic productivity and past values of FDI. 
Although year-to-year variation in the share of foreign presence in the Greek 
economy  is  limited,  which  somewhat  problematises  the  identification  of  this 
mechanism  in  our  data,  our  estimations  that  test  the  hysterisis  hypothesis 
(columns  11  and  12)  do  not  seem  to  support this  assumption:  the  estimated 
spillovers remain negative when we replace the contemporaneous FDI variable 
with its one- and two-year lags. In fact, the magnitude of the negative FDI effect 
is  actually  increasing,  suggesting  if  anything  a  deterioration  of  domestic 
productivity as a response to foreign presence over time. It thus appears that 
domestic firms do not adapt (at least not in a two-year horizon) to the negative 
shock of foreign presence and continue to suffer from the increased competition 
generated by the foreign affiliates. Again, this is consistent with the view of 
Greece as an economy that lacks dynamism and where competition is largely a 
zero-sum game which does not lead to market expansion. 
Returning to the point that we raised earlier about the geographical scale 
at  which  the  positive  and  negative  spillovers  of  FDI  occur,  in  the  last  two 
columns of Table 2 we include simultaneously two FDI variables, measured at 
two different geographical scales (NUTS2 and NUTS3), alternatively excluding 
and  then  including  our  controls  for  regional  fixed  effects.  In  both  cases,  an 
interesting  pattern  emerges:  FDI  spillovers  appear  negative  at  the  wider 
geographical scale but are consistently positive at the more localised level.
9 This 
suggests that locally concentrated FDI helps the performance of domestic firms, 
especially in comparison  to the performance of similar firms in other NUTS3 
regions (since the estimated NUTS3 spillover is stronger and larger when n ot 
including regional fixed effects). At the same time, concentration of FDI in 
neighbouring  areas,  within  a  local  economy‟s  administrative  region,  has  an 
absolute negative effect on the performance of domestic firms. This offers an 
important insight into the workings of FDI spillovers in Greece. Positive FDI 
spillovers, presumably due to both pecuniary (demand) and technology effects 
(demonstration, imitation), do exist, but they are very localised. Indeed, these 
benefits do not diffuse to wider geographical scales and thus at the regional (and 
national)  level  the  competition  and  market  capture  effect  of  FDI  dominates. 
Therefore, despite the localised benefits, the overall effect of FDI on domestic 
                                                           
9  The  NUTS2  and  NUTS3  spillover  coefficients  reported  in  columns  13  and  14  are  not 
simultaneously  significant  statistically.  They  are  however  jointly  significant  in  each  of  the 
regressions and also significantly different from each other. When replicating these regressions 
without clustering the standard errors all coefficients are highly significant even at the 0.1% level.   DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT?    153 
 
productivity, when taking into account the tendency of foreign investments to 
self-select into high-productivity regions and sectors, is negative.  
 
4. Spatial and functional heterogeneity of FDI spillovers  
The  literature  on  FDI  productivity  spillovers  has  often  found  that 
spillovers  do  not  accrue  homogeneously  across  different  types  of  firms  and 
sectors but are rather dependent on specific firm characteristics such as size, 
technology content and sector of economic activity. A similar argument can be 
made about the heterogeneity of FDI effects across space, especially under the 
light of our preceding discussion and findings. In this section we explore these 
two issues, starting with the functional dimension. Table 3 reports the results 
from  a  set  of  regressions  where  we  split  the  sample  across  sectoral 
characteristics  (manufacturing  versus  non-manufacturing,  high-tech  sectors 
versus low-tech sectors), firm sizes (large, medium, small), and firm-specific 
technological content (high/low technology gap
10). We perform this analysis for 
two alternative specifications, fi rst excluding (top panel) and then including 
regional fixed effects (bottom panel).  
The results are particularly revealing. Although in virtually all cases the 
pattern  of  positive  localised  spillovers  and  negative  overall  spillovers  is 
maintained  (with th e  exception  of  the  results  obtained  for  large  firms,  as 
discussed below), there are important variations in the effects observed for 
different firm types. The impact of FDI is much more heightened outside the 
manufacturing sector: the positive localised (N UTS3) effect is stronger, while 
the negative diffused (NUTS2) effect is also more pronounced. In contrast, the 
impact of FDI in the manufacturing sector is statistically weak (although the 
introduction of only one FDI variable at a time makes the results consistent with 
our earlier analysis). This is true both for including or excluding regional fixed 
effects. In the latter case, the negative diffused effect becomes larger, while the 
positive localised effect is smaller. This suggests that in non -manufacturing 
sectors  foreign  firms  self -select  into  high -productivity  localities  but, 
interestingly, away from localities that are neighbouring to high productivity 
ones.
11  
In a somewhat similar fashion, localised FDI spillovers appear stronger 
(more positive) in high-tech sectors, especially when we do not control for self-
selection, and the diffused spillover effect appears more negative, especially 
                                                           
10 This is measured as the distance of each domestic firm from the productivity frontier of its 
sector, proxied by the level of productivity achieved by the most productive foreign-owned firm in 
the sector nationally.  
11 For the manufacturing sector the opposite pattern is observed, with foreign firms self -selecting 
into broader regions of high productivity but not necessarily into the localities with the highest 
productivity within these broad regions. The results here, however, lack statistical significance and 
thus this interpretation is tentative.  154   Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN 
 
when  we  do  control for  self-selection.  Although  the  results for the  low-tech 
sectors  are  of  a  similar  nature,  they  are  more  modest  and  at  the  margin  of 
statistical significance. Our findings, however, differ markedly when we split 
our sample by firm size. For large firms, the presence of foreign-owned affiliates 
within the same locality appears to produce negative, not positive, productivity 
effects,  especially  when  we  control  for  self-selection.  In  contrast,  it  is  the 
diffused spillovers that turn out positive. This suggests an interesting property 
for large firms in Greece: co-location with foreign affiliates seems to hamper 
their  performance,  presumably  as  large  firms  have  less  to  gain  from 
demonstration  effects  and  pecuniary  spillovers  accruing  from  their  foreign-
owned competitors; but the agglomeration of foreign firms in the wider region 
outside  the  domestic  large  firms‟  own  locality  has  a  positive  effect  on  their 
performance. The absence of localised benefits in the presence of wider-scale 
ones  seems  to  suggest  that  foreign-firm  concentration  tends  to  generate  a 
market-creation effect for large firms, which is not operational in the case of 
medium and small firms within the same sector. For the latter, and especially for 
medium-sized firms, the main (and only) benefit is from the presence of foreign 
affiliates within the local economy, while the wider-scale effect is consistently 
and  very  strongly  negative.  An  obvious  interpretation  of  this  finding  is  that 
smaller firms do not have the reach to capture the benefits from the market-
creation effect at wider geographical scales. Medium-sized firms appear able to 
internalise successfully some of the positive spillovers of foreign participation in 
the local economy, while very small firms lack the absorptive capacity to do so, 
which would explain why the estimated localised spillover effect fails to reach 
acceptable levels of statistical significance for these firms. 
The level of productivity (technology  gap) of domestic firms does not 
seem to be a crucial factor for the realisation of FDI spillovers. Firms with a 
lower technological gap appear to benefit more from the presence of foreign 
firms in the local economy and to suffer less from the agglomeration of foreign 
affiliates at the wider geographical scale outside the local economy – although 
self-selection appears to be more important here than in the case of firms with a 
lower  technology  content  (higher  technology  gap).
12  When  controlling  for 
selection, the latter appear to be better placed to reap the benefits of co -location 
(technology  transfers  and  pecuniary  effects),  although  they  remain  more 
susceptible to suffering from competition with foreign-owned firms at a wider 
geographical scale (market capture effect).  
What do these patterns imply for the geography of productivity spillovers 
accruing from the geographical concentration of foreign-owned firms across the 
Greek economy? 
                                                           
12  This  implies  that  foreign  firms  tend  to  locate  in  areas  with  higher  concentrations  of  high 
technology firms within any given sector – a finding which is consistent with widespread evidence 
in the literature concerning the location of FDI.  DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT?    155 
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We examine this by replicating the regressions presented in columns 5 
and 10 of Table 2, this time interacting the FDI variable with a set of regional 
(alternatively, NUTS2 and NUTS3) dummies.
13 This provides us with a full set 
of region-specific estimates of the productivity effects of FDI on domestic firms. 
It is of course difficult to report the full set of obtained coefficients in tabular 
form (in the NUTS3 analysis, this set contains 51 region -specific spillover 
coefficients). Instead, in Figure 4 we offer a visualisation of the magnitude and 
geography of these effects.  
Figure 4. Region-specific estimates of local FDI spillovers 
 
           Without local/regional fixed-effects    Including local/regional fixed effects 
Notes: Estimated coefficients derived from an extension of models 5 and 10 of Table 2, which 
includes interaction terms between the FDI variable and the regional dummies. See the text for 
more details.  
                                                           
13 We can not replicate this analysis for the models presented in columns 13 and 14 of Table 2, as 
the  NUTS2-level  effects  are  absorbed  completely  by  the  NUTS3-level  effects  when  both  are 
included in the same model.   
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The top panel depicts the results obtained from the NUTS3-level analysis 
(corresponding to the regression of column 10 in Table 2), while the bottom 
panel presents the results of the NUTS2-level analysis. The right-hand side maps 
correspond to regressions that include locational fixed effects (regional or local), 
which take into account the self-selection of foreign firms into high-productivity 
regions.  
As can be seen, there is significant variation both in the size and, more 
importantly, in the direction of the estimated effects. At the NUTS2 level, when 
not  controlling  for  self-selection  (bottom-left  map),  this  variation  is  less 
heightened and the overall picture appears to be one of a core-periphery pattern. 
Peripheral regions in the north-east, west and south appear unable to internalise 
positive  productivity  spillovers,  thus  ending  up  with  a  net  loss  in  their 
performance. In contrast, more central regions, especially in central and western 
mainland  Greece,  experience  net  gains  from  the  presence  of  foreign-owned 
firms.  
Controlling for self-selection, however, completely overturns this picture: 
in  this  case,  the  direct  productivity  effect  of  FDI  is  negative  in  all  regions 
(consistent with the findings reported in column 5 of Table 2), but with one 
important  exception.  The  region  of  Eastern  Macedonia  and  Thrace  (EMT: 
located in north-east mainland Greece) appears now to benefit from positive 
spillovers, suggesting that self-selection in this region operates in the opposite 
direction.  The  structure  of  incentives  operating  in  this  region  through  the 
country‟s Incentives Laws (Filippaios and Kottaridi, 2004) may have a big role 
to play here, as foreign firms may locate there not because the region offers a 
high concentration of more productive firms but rather because the structure of 
incentives  provided  by  the  government  attracts  high-productivity  foreign 
affiliates  to  this  low-productivity  region.  In  any  case,  the  issue  of  regional 
incentives aside, our results suggest that had average productivity in this region 
been  the  same  as  the  average  productivity  nationally,  the  effect  of  foreign 
presence in the region would have been to raise the overall productivity of the 
domestic firms located there.  
The NUTS3-level analysis (top panel) suggests that this is essentially due 
to two more localised effects: a negative effect in Xanthi (located in the middle 
of the EMT region), which after controlling for selection turns mildly positive, 
and a mildly positive effect in Evros (the eastern-most prefecture of the EMT 
region), which after controlling for selection becomes even stronger. Besides 
this, self-selection seems to operate more strongly (and to result to a negative 
overall effect of FDI) in the prefectures of Attiki, Thessaloniki and Larissa –the 
regions hosting three of the five largest cities in Greece– and less strongly in the 
case  of  Etoloakarnania  (the  western-most  region  of  central  Greece).  FDI 
spillovers  are  invariably  negative  (irrespective  of  controls  for  region-specific 
fixed  effects)  in  Pella  (in  the  north),  Kerkyra  (the  western-most  island)  and 158   Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN 
 
Chania and Irakleio (both in the southern-most island of Crete); while inverse 
self-selection (into low productivity regions) appears, besides Xanthi and Evros, 
in  the  cases  of  Argolida  (south-west  of  Athens),  Lasithi  (in  eastern  Crete), 
Trikala  (located  north  of  central  Greece),  Ipeiros  (west  of  Trikala)  and  the 
Dodecanese  (the  south-eastern  island  complex).  Interestingly,  the  estimated 
spillovers of FDI are persistently negligible in the prefectures of Lesvos (north-
east  islands),  Rethymno  (in  Crete),  Voiotia  (north  of  Athens),  Magnisia  (in 
central-east  mainland  Greece)  and  Achaia  and  Korinthos  (both  in  northern 
Peloponese)
14, while the most positive FDI effect at the NUTS3 level, which 
appears also independent of self-selection, is observed in the case of Prevez a –
whose  predominantly  agricultural  economy  (representing  some  30%  of  total 
employment) has attracted in the past some modest, but highly concentrated, 
foreign investment in the manufacture of wood and wood products.  
 
5. Discussion 
This  paper  has  sought  to  contribute  to  filling  an  important  gap  in  the 
literature of FDI-induced spillovers, by providing a detailed and novel analysis 
of the spatial heterogeneity of the productivity effects of foreign-owned firms at 
the local and regional level. Our results confirm that FDI tends to concentrate in 
a limited number of locations, self-selecting into regions and sectors of high 
productivity.  It  thus  acts  to  heighten  existing  spatial  imbalances,  as  the 
productive  capacity  of  the  most  developed  regions  is  strengthened  and  the 
relative performance of regions located in the economic periphery deteriorates. 
Nevertheless,  although  this  effect  on  the  spatial  structure  is  important,  our 
analysis has found that FDI does not raise the productivity of domestic firms, 
neither  contemporaneously  nor  in  a  longer  time-horizon.  In  this  sense,  the 
concentration  of  FDI  in  the  most  developed  regions  in  the  country  is  not  a 
hindrance to regional growth and convergence for the less well-off regions. This 
is consistent with the scant evidence in the literature about the localised effects 
of FDI.  
Besides  this,  our  analysis  has  shown  further  that  the  productivity 
spillovers  of  FDI  exhibit  substantial  heterogeneity  across  space,  even  after 
controlling for regional differences in the volume and sectoral composition of 
FDI. To our knowledge, this is a unique finding in the literature. Moreover, it 
has  very  important  policy  implications,  pointing  to  a  strong  need  for  FDI-
attracting policies to incorporate a clear regional dimension. This is because if, 
as  it  seems,  FDI  is  not  equally  beneficial  (or  harmful)  across  the  national 
economic space, maximising the benefits of FDI at the aggregate/national level 
necessitates paying specific attention to the set of endogenous (e.g., average firm 
sizes)  and  exogenous  (e.g.,  proximity  to  main  agglomerations)  locational 
                                                           
14 This is despite the fact that the latter four are rather highly industrialised regions.  DOES FDI PROMOTE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT?    159 
 
characteristics that influence local abilities to benefit from FDI spillovers. In 
other words, it requires policies that are spatially targeted and selective.   
Our  analysis  has  identified  a  number  of  factors  that  condition  the 
externalities generated by the presence of foreign-owned activity. Some of these, 
concerning firm- and sector-specific characteristics, have already been identified 
in the literature and the evidence presented here has lent further support to them. 
Two other factors identified in our analysis, however, are novel in character and 
perhaps also more important for understanding the spatial processes that underlie 
FDI spillovers. The first has to do with the extent of urbanisation and the size of 
the  recipient  economy.  Our  results  indicate  that  FDI  spillovers  are  negative 
mainly  in  regions  that  host  the  largest  urban  areas  (Athens,  Thessaloniki, 
Irakleio,  Larissa).  In  contrast,  they  are  positive,  even  after  controlling  for 
selection,  in  smaller  and  more  peripheral  regions.  Whether  this  signifies  an 
adverse agglomeration effect or something qualitatively different
15, its policy 
implications are clear. At least in the case of Greece, the spatial selectivity of 
policies seeking to maximise the productivity effects of FDI should be such so as 
to direct foreign investments towards less dynamic, less urbanised and less 
competitive regions in the country. This is particularly relevant for Greece today, 
as the country is ready to embark on a new phase of FDI promotion to deal with 
the acute investment problems that it faces following the fiscal crisis and the 
austerity measures that were implemented to address it.  
The second factor concerns geographical proximity and the scale of the 
spillovers. Domestic firms tend to enjoy positive FDI spillovers at the very 
localised level (with the exception of large domestic firms, which operate at a 
different scale), even after controlling for self-selection of FDI firms into high-
productivity areas. The overall effect remains negative, but this is due to a very 
strong negative effect on local productivity coming from the location of foreign 
investments in neighbouring regions. The implication of this finding is of 
paramount importance and has foregone   the attention in most of the FDI 
literature so  far:  not only  is  the  effect  of  FDI  spatially  heterogeneous  or 
conditioned on specific firm, sectoral, and regional characteristics, it is moreover 
dependent on geographical proximity.  
To us, this seems to suggest that different mechanisms are in operation at 
different geographical scales  –  at  least  in  the  case  of  Greece.  Although  we 
cannot provide conclusive evidence to support this interpretation, it appears that 
processes of technology diffusion and learning are very localised, taking place at 
the  prefectural  level  within  NUTS3  areas.  In  contrast,  at  wider  geographical 
scales  the  effect  that  dominates  is  a  negative  competition  effect  of  market 
capture and demand siphoning, where foreign-owned firms limit the market size 
                                                           
15 For example, it is consistent with the observation that FDI spillovers tend to be weaker in areas 
exposed to high domestic and international competition, because firms in such areas have already 
acquired the technological features that foreign-owned firms are believed to incorporate. 160   Vassilis MONASTIRIOTIS and Jacob A. JORDAAN 
 
of the domestic firms and thus push upwards their average production costs and 
reduce their productivity – as domestic firms find it difficult to adjust either 
positively (for example, through product differentiation and expansion to new 
markets) or negatively (through disinvestment and downsizing) to the foreign 
presence. This may be a feature unique to Greece, as the country is known to 
have rather inflexible industrial relations and inefficient managerial practices, 
but our sense is that it may be true, perhaps to different extents, also in other 
countries,  at  least  in  cases  where  significant  spatial  differences  exist  in  the 
competitiveness and extroversion of local firms.  
The extent to which this is true, and the particular mechanics under which 
this process takes effect (e.g., the role of agglomeration, openness, industrial 
diversity, etc), is something that we could not address in this paper and that 
future research needs to address. For what concerns the present analysis, the 
main conclusions that we can draw are the following. Foreign investments have 
inequitable  location  patterns  that  can  intensify  existing  spatial  and  sectoral 
asymmetries. In economies such as that of Greece, however, such investments 
do not generate positive productivity spillovers, especially in more developed 
regions. Therefore, their overall impact on relative regional performance and 
cross-regional  convergence  is  not  detrimental.  Positive  spillovers,  when  they 
exist, are very localised and dominated by wider-area negative market-capture 
effects. It follows that a successful FDI promotion and regional development 
policy is not a policy that maximises the FDI flows accruing to the country but 
one that addresses effectively two key issues: the location of FDI within the 
national  economic  space  and  the  conversion  of  negative  competition  into 
economic extroversion and market expansion.  
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